The neural circuits underlying initial sensory processing of somatic information are relatively well understood. In contrast, the processes that go beyond primary somatosensation to create more abstract representations related to the body are less clear. In this review, we focus on two classes of higher-order processing beyond somatosensation. Somatoperception refers to the process of perceiving the body itself, and particularly of ensuring somatic perceptual constancy. We review three key elements of somatoperception: (a) remapping information from the body surface into an egocentric reference frame, (b) exteroceptive perception of objects in the external world through their contact with the body, and (c) interoceptive percepts about the nature and state of the body itself. Somatorepresentation, in contrast, refers to the essentially cognitive process of constructing semantic knowledge and attitudes about the body, including: (d) lexical-semantic knowledge about bodies generally and one's own body specifically, (e) configural knowledge about the structure of bodies, (f) emotions and attitudes directed towards one's own body, and (g) the link between physical body and psychological self. We review a wide range of neuropsychological, neuroimaging and neurophysiological data to explore the dissociation between these different aspects of higher somatosensory function.
Introduction
Our body is a unique object in the world. On the one hand, the body is the seat of our sensations and the reference of firstperson experience. Sensations on the body surface or from the viscera have a private character, distinct from the public availability of visual or auditory stimuli (Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan, 1995; Evans, 1982) . On the other hand, one's body is also a physical object, like any other in the external world. This duality suggests two modes by which we can experience and understand our body. On the one hand, we can feel our body pre-reflectively, from the inside, as an object of direct perception; on the other, we can reflect cognitively on our body, from the outside, as a physical and biological object. Thus, it is important to distinguish between how we perceive our body to be, and how we remember or believe that it is (cf. Lhermitte, 1942) . A large body of research in experimental psychology, psychophysics, and neurophysiology has investigated basic mechanisms of somatosensation (for reviews see, Iwamura, 1998; Johnson & Hsiao, 1992; Mountcastle, 2005; Romo & Salinas, 2001) . But much less is known about how the brain goes beyond basic somatosensation to construct (1) higher- * Corresponding author.
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level percepts of the body and objects contacting the body, which we term somatoperception, and (2) abstract knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes about bodies generally and one's own body specifically, which we term somatorepresentation (see Table 1 ). Here, we review these processes of somatoperception and somatorepresentation.
Various illusions illustrate this distinction between on-line perception and off-line representation of the body. In the case of individuals with phantom limbs following amputation, for example, the missing limb is perceived to be present, even though the patient well knows that it is absent (Melzack, 1992; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998) . Often the phantom sensation is extremely vivid and realistic, to the point that patients may attempt to walk on their phantom leg (Melzack, 1990) . This conflict demonstrates the presence of two types of representation: (1) a perceptual representation (what the body is felt to be like) which has not been updated to reflect the amputation, and (2) a cognitive representation (what the body is believed to be like) which has been updated. Thus, phantom limbs provide an example of an intervention (i.e., amputation) which can induce a selective modification of cognitive -but not perceptual -body representations.
Conversely, other illusions provide evidence for selective modification of perceptual information about the body, without change in body representation. For example, Lackner's (1988) Pinocchio illusion relies on vibrating muscle tendons to trigger afferent signals to the brain that the muscle is lengthening. This produces
